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policy would have supported the stock market to
some degree in 1930-32, would it be accurate to
say that the Fed had “bailed out” equity investors
and created moral hazard by doing so? I note that
a more expansionary monetary policy in 1930-32
would, presumably, have supported not only the
stock market but also the bond and mortgage
markets and the banking system—by reducing
the number of defaults created by business and
household bankruptcies in subsequent years.
Now apply these questions to the current sit-
uation. Did the Fed “bail out” the markets with
its policy adjustments starting in August of this
year? Have we observed an example of what some
observers have come to call the “Fed put,” typi-
cally named after the chairman in office, such as
the “Greenspan put” or the “Bernanke put”?1
Why has no one, at least not recently to my knowl-
edge, argued that a more expansionary Fed policy
in 1930-32 would have “bailed out” the stock
market at that time and, by implication, have
been unwise?
I can state my conclusion compactly: There
is a sense in which a Fed put does exist. However,
those who believe that the Fed put reflects unwise
monetary policy misunderstand the responsibil-
ities of a central bank. The basic argument is very
simple: A monetary policy that stabilizes the price
level and the real economy cannot create moral
hazard because there is no hazard, moral or other-
wise. Nor does monetary policy action designed
to prevent a financial upset from cascading into
financial crisis create moral hazard. Finally, the
F
ederal Reserve policy actions starting
this past August to temper strains in
financial markets have generated con-
siderable commentary, some of which
reflect concerns that policy action in such cir-
cumstances creates moral hazard. The issue is
extremely important, and, given that it is so
current, this is a good time to reflect in general
on the Fed’s reactions to financial market devel-
opments. The concern over moral hazard is that
monetary policy action to alleviate financial
distress may complicate policy in the future, by
encouraging risky investing in the securities mar-
kets. There are so few instances of market turmoil
similar to the current situation that I’ll broaden
the analysis to include significant stock market
declines. Doing so gives us a substantial sample
to discuss. Thus, my topic is whether Federal
Reserve policy responses to financial market
developments should be regarded as “bailing out”
market participants and creating moral hazard
by doing so.
To begin to explore the moral hazard issue,
consider an extreme case, which I offer as a provo-
cation to promote careful analysis and not as an
example directly relevant to today’s circum-
stances. Fact: The U.S. stock market between its
peak in 1929 and its trough in 1932 declined by
85 percent. Question 1: If the Fed had followed a
more expansionary policy in 1930-32, sufficient
to avoid the Great Depression, would the stock
market have declined so much? Question 2:
Assuming that a more expansionary monetary
1 A put option contract provides that the buyer of the contract can sell an item, such as 100 shares of common stock of a particular company,
for a certain price—the strike price—for a certain period. The contract protects the buyer from declines in the stock price beyond the strike
price. The “Fed put” terminology implies that Fed policy adjustments, by analogy with a put option, will prevent stock price declines beyond
some point.notion that the Fed responds to stock market
declines per se, independent of the relationship
of such declines to achievement of the Fed’s dual
mandate in the Federal Reserve Act, is not sup-
ported by evidence from decades of monetary
history.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I appreciate comments and
research assistance provided by my colleagues at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. However,
I retain full responsibility for errors.
My approach will be to start by discussing
bailouts and moral hazard in general. I will then
examine the record of stock market declines and
Fed policy adjustments and analyze how mone-
tary policy changes the nature of risks in financial
and goods markets. Finally, I will argue that the
ways in which monetary policy alters risks in
the markets yield benefits for the economy and
do not create moral hazard.
UNDERSTANDING BAILOUTS
A traditional bailout involves governmental
assistance to a particular firm, group of firms, or
group of individuals. For ease of exposition, I’ll
concentrate on bailouts of firms but the same
issues apply to bailouts of households. There
may be occasions when a government infusion
of capital to save a firm is justified, such as a
bailout of a major defense contractor during
wartime. However, most economists believe that
bailouts are rarely justified and only in compelling
circumstances should the government bail out
individuals or firms.2
An important reason for opposition to bailouts
is that it is essentially impossible for a bailout not
to set a precedent for the future. A bailout creates
what is known in the economics and insurance
literature as (aforementioned) “moral hazard” by
creating a presumption that in the future the
government may again rescue a failing firm. That
presumption encourages a firm and its investors
to be less careful than they otherwise would be
about taking risks. If a firm expects a bailout, it
believes that government help will cover losses
while the firm’s owners can enjoy the gains, if any,
from risky strategies. When the government is
expected to absorb losses, bailouts unavoidably
increase inappropriate risk taking, which increases
the likelihood of losses in the future.
A standard problem in writing and adminis-
tering insurance contracts is that the buyer of
insurance has less incentive, by virtue of being
insured, to control risk. Almost everyone has had
the experience, far from uplifting, of talking with
someone who says, “don’t worry—it’s insured.”
The very existence of insurance may change the
behavior of the insured person. Insurance com-
panies try to deal with moral hazard in a variety
of ways, such as by writing contracts with sub-
stantial deductibles or loss sharing. Such contract
provisions provide an incentive for the insured
to control risk.
Government guarantee programs also gener-
ally require some loss sharing, but there are many
government programs and practices that do not
adequately control moral hazard. Perhaps the
most dangerous practice is the ex post bailout,
where a firm is rescued outside of any regular or
standing program. Such a bailout can change the
rules of the competitive game in unpredictable
ways. No one can know whether a bailout will
be repeated or not. Those who control risks and
actually bear losses will justifiably believe that a
taxpayer-funded bailout of another firm is unfair.
The Federal Reserve has no funds and no
authority to provide capital or guarantees to firms
to provide a bailout in the traditional sense. The
Fed cannot even bail out banks. The Fed can
make loans to banks, but only loans that are fully
secured by good collateral and only to banks that
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2 Of course, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is obligated to protect depositors from loss on covered deposits and it is some-
times true that the cheapest way to handle a failed bank is to merge it with another bank, with the FDIC providing a capital infusion. To the
extent that there is a safety net for uninsured depositors, a bank bailout does raise moral hazard issues. I do not mean to imply that “too big
to fail” is not an important issue for federal policy.are well capitalized. The Fed can lend to weak
banks requiring emergency assistance to prevent
immediate collapse, but again only to those with
adequate collateral. The Fed works cooperatively
with the FDIC and other bank regulators to close
a bank in distress or to find a willing buyer.
Creditors sometimes bail out debtors to a
degree, by restructuring obligations to extend the
repayment period or to reduce the interest rate.
Restructuring a mortgage is often in the interest
of the borrower, who may be able to avoid fore-
closure. Restructuring may make sense for the
lender to avoid the costs of bankruptcy and to
obtain the maximum possible return from a failing
loan. Nevertheless, lenders obviously must be
careful not to make terms too easy for a borrower
lest other borrowers ask for similar terms or future
borrowers fail to service their obligations. A bail-
out of this sort is fundamentally different from a
government bailout because the lender suffers
the loss and not the taxpayer. Losses motivate
lenders to be more disciplined in their future
decisions.
Why do we use the term “moral hazard”?
Using the insurance example, the hazard to the
insurance company arises from behavior induced
by insurance that may be adverse to the interests
of the insurer. The “moral” in “moral hazard”
refers to behavior the insured knows is adverse
to the insurer’s interest—behavior the insured
would not engage in were he to suffer the full
consequences of the behavior. Insurance compa-
nies try to maintain practices designed to encour-
age appropriate behavior. If an insurance company
provides a premium discount for a driver who
submits no insurance claims over a certain num-
ber of years and the discount in fact encourages
safer driving, then that effect is not “moral haz-
ard.” From the perspective of the insurer, the
policy changes behavior in a desirable rather than
a harmful way. This point is a critical one in the
context of monetary policy, to which I now turn.
THE FED PUT
The “Fed put” argument is usually stated in
terms of monetary policy reactions to stock mar-
ket declines. Consider Figure 1, which plots the
natural log of the S&P 500 index and identifies
all stock market declines of 10 percent or more
since 1950.3 The figure also shows a measure of
the Federal Reserve’s policy rate.4 The policy rate
in the figure is the discount rate before October 1,
1982, and the federal funds target rate thereafter.
Shaded areas show recessions as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
The figure shows 21 stock market declines of
10 percent or more. Within three months of these
stock market peaks, the Fed held the policy rate
constant, or increased it, on 12 occasions. There
was a Fed rate cut within three months on nine
occasions,5 but for five of these nine rate cuts the
Fed acted before the stock market peak; its policy
actions could not have been motivated by stock
market declines. Fed rate cuts did follow the
stock market peak in late September 1976; the
first rate cut came nine weeks later.6 Another case
occurred after the market peak in July 1998; a
Fed rate cut in late September was a response to
the situation in the money markets following the
near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
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3 The S&P 500 series is the weekly close (Friday close unless Friday is a holiday). Each market peak was defined this way: Under criterion 1,
the peak exceeded the previous peak and the market declined by 10 percent or more following the peak. Under criterion 2, the peak, followed
by a decline of at least 10 percent, did not exceed the previous peak but a recovery of at least 10 percent had occurred between the two peaks.
4 The policy rate in the figure is the Fed’s discount rate before October 1982 and the FOMC’s federal funds target rate thereafter. Other meas-
ures are available for certain parts of the period before 1982, but using them would create several discontinuities in the policy rate series.
See Rudebusch (1995, Table 3a) for a federal funds target rate series for 1974-79.
5 One of the nine was the market peak in November 1968. As the figure makes clear, the rate cut preceding this market peak was small and
temporary. Subsequently, the Fed raised rates and the cuts did not begin until the end of the 1969-70 recession, at which point stock prices
started to rise.
6 Rudebusch (1995, Table 3a) identifies two cuts totaling 25 basis points in the FOMC’s target federal funds rate in July 1976 and two more
totaling another 25 basis points in October. By this measure, therefore, Fed rate cuts began before the September 1976 stock market peak.(LTCM) and not a response to the stock market
per se.7
The market peak in March 2000 ushered in
the great bear market that ended in October 2002.
The initial decline was sharp, but the market
recovered to reach another peak in early
September 2000 that was only slightly lower than
the March 2000 peak. During the course of the
bear market, there were several peaks, each
lower than the one preceding, following signifi-
cant recoveries. During this period, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) cut the policy
rate in 10 steps from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent
in December 2001 and in two more steps to 1
percent in June 2003. The policy rate cuts were
not closely related to the stock market declines
after the local peaks and declines that continued
until the market hit bottom in October 2002.
Because the “put” language became current
during the Greenspan era, let’s examine stock
market declines of 5 percent or more that did not
reach the 10 percent threshold. Using the 5 percent
criterion, there was a market peak in September
1989, and the Fed did cut its policy rate follow-
ing that peak. However, the Fed had started to cut
rates in June 1989. Another market peak meeting
the 5 percent criterion occurred in late January
1994, when the policy rate was 3 percent. There
was another such peak in August 1994. The Fed
proceeded to raise the policy rate several times
in 1994, starting in February, and it reached 6
percent in January 1995.
Another market peak meeting the 5 percent
criterion occurred in June 1996. The FOMC had
cut the policy rate to 5.25 percent in January 1996,
and the policy rate remained there until the FOMC
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7 The transcripts of FOMC meetings in 1998 provide excellent insight into the Committee’s motivation in dealing with the LTCM situation. Of
course, motivation is not the end of the matter; well-intentioned actions can have unintended adverse effects. The 1998 and 1999 transcripts
show that the Committee was well aware of the potential for inflationary consequences of policy easing in response to the LTCM situation.







































































































































































































Declines Greater Than 10 Percent in the S&P 500 and Fed Policy Rateraised it in March 1997. This increase occurred
shortly after another stock market peak meeting
the 5 percent criterion earlier the same month.
Two more peaks meeting the 5 percent criterion—
one in August 1997 and one in December 1997—
occurred while the FOMC was holding the policy
rate constant at 5.5 percent.
This history makes clear that it just is not true
that the FOMC has eased policy in systematic
fashion at the time of stock market declines, with
the exception of the period following the 1987
stock market crash. Even this experience, however,
reinforces the argument that the FOMC’s primary
concern is with its macroeconomic objectives and
not with the stock market itself. Policy easing
occurs at times of recession, although sometimes
is delayed because of concern over inflation. The
Fed eased policy ahead of the 1990-91 recession
and ahead of the 2001 recession. The Fed has also
eased policy in response to turmoil in the credit
markets, as in the fall of 1998 and starting in
August of 2007. Clearly, though, on numerous
occasions the Fed has held its policy rate con-
stant, or raised it, as stock prices declined.
EFFECTS OF FED STABILIZATION
POLICY ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
Although there is no evidence that the Fed
responds to the stock market per se, there is an
element of truth to the argument that Fed policy
can limit downside risk in the stock market. The
same Fed policy that succeeds in stabilizing the
price level and the real economy should tend to
stabilize financial markets as well. Thus, the ele-
ment of truth in the “Fed put” view reflects
expected and desirable outcomes from successful
monetary policy. General economic stability, by
which I mean both stability of the price level and
of the real economy, does change the nature of
risks in the financial markets and, therefore,
changes investor strategies.
Consider the second of Graham and Dodd’s
“Four Principles for the Selection of Issues of
the Fixed-Income Type”:
The rule that a sound investment must be able
to withstand adversity seems self-evident
enough to be termed a truism. Any bond or
preferred stock can do well when conditions
are favorable; it is only under the acid test of
depression that the advantages of strong over
weak issues become manifest and vitally
important. For this reason prudent investors
have always favored the obligations of old-
established enterprises which have demon-
strated their ability to come through bad times
as well as good.” (Graham and Dodd, 1951,
p. 289)
With regard to inflation risk, Graham and
Dodd say that “[t]hese wide movements of the
general price level…seem to carry the lesson that
the long-term trend is toward inflation, punctu-
ated by equally troublesome periods of deflation.
Investment policy must accommodate itself, as
far as it can, to both possibilities” (Graham and
Dodd, 1951, p. 8).
How many investors today measure the value
of a bond by the likelihood that it will continue
to pay interest “under the acid test of depression”?
How many investors today maintain portfolios
robust against the possibility of inflation of the
magnitude experienced in the 1970s or deflation
of the magnitude experienced in the early 1930s?
The answer, I believe, is “not many.”
The fact that few investors worry about
extreme economic instability is a benefit of
sound monetary policy and not a cost; changes
in investor practice are conducive to higher pro-
ductivity growth. The same is true for changes in
household and firm behavior reflecting the greatly
reduced risk of economic depression or even
severe recession of the magnitude of 1981-82. If
we did not believe that economic stability is good
for the economy and for society, why would a
stable price level and high employment be mon-
etary policy goals? Just as a deductible changes
behavior of insurance policyholders, so also does
economic stability change investor behavior.
Economists have long argued that price stabil-
ity improves economic efficiency, in part because
businesses and individuals can make decisions
under the assumption that they do not need to
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ing price level. Inflation and deflation distort
relative prices; such distortion leads to misallo-
cations of resources. With greatly reduced risk of
price level instability, investors concentrate on
risks relating to changes in demands, technology,
and relative prices. Better evaluation of these
risks promotes more efficient allocation of capital
and fosters higher economic growth.
Monetary policy success in stabilizing the
general level of prices does not eliminate risks
for the economy. The real effects of inflation or
deflation, should either occur in the future, will
be magnified precisely because the economy
today has adjusted relatively completely to an
environment of price stability. One of the reasons
the Great Inflation was so costly was that eco-
nomic agents in 1965 did not anticipate the infla-
tion. Decisions and institutions that had been
sensible and efficient in an environment of price
stability became unprofitable as inflation rose
after 1965.
When events threaten to create inflation or
deflation, the Fed ought to act to maintain price
stability. It is true that Fed actions in such circum-
stances “bail out” investors who would lose large
sums should inflation or deflation take hold. But
“bail out” is a completely inappropriate term to
use in this context, for it implies costs of the sort
discussed earlier when the government provides
capital to support firms that would otherwise go
bankrupt. The central bank is supposed to stabi-
lize the price level; the economy is better off when
people act on a justified belief that the central
bank will be successful.
Exactly the same argument applies to central
bank actions in response to events or shocks that
might drive the economy into recession, or into
an unsustainable boom. Provided that the central
bank does not sacrifice long-run price stability, it
can and should respond to new information
indicating an increased risk of recession. There
is no conflict between the goals of price stability
and high employment. Price stability and expec-
tations of price stability permit the central bank
to respond constructively to shocks that threaten
to destabilize the real economy. Those who still
believe that there is a trade-off between inflation
and unemployment should reflect on the facts
that the Great Depression was a consequence of
deflation and the recessions of 1969, 1973-75,
1980, and 1981-82 were consequences of the
Great Inflation.
With respect to financial instability, the cen-
tral bank has the responsibility to do what it can
to alleviate market turmoil. When there is a wide-
spread increase in risk aversion and a flight to
safe assets, the central bank ought to provide
extra liquidity to prevent bank runs from bringing
down the banking system. Provision of extra
central bank liquidity does “bail out” firms that
had not maintained sufficient liquidity them-
selves. Here again, though, the term “bail out,”
with its pejorative connotations, is completely
inappropriate. In a fractional reserve banking
system, it is simply impossible for owners of
bank liabilities to convert all their liquid claims
to cash, but the effort to do so will drive down
aggregate demand. The same argument applies
to liquid claims issued by non-bank financial
firms. Widespread bank failures will destroy the
claims of prudent investors, as well as of the
imprudent.
For a fractional reserve banking system to
work, a central bank must stand ready to be the
ultimate source of liquidity for solvent banks, and
banks in turn take the credit risk of providing
liquidity to solvent non-bank firms. By “solvent,”
what I mean in this context is that a firm’s assets
valued at a normal level of economic activity
cover the firm’s liabilities, leaving a reasonable
level of net worth. The firm’s capital can absorb
losses occasioned by normal business risks. We
can argue about what “normal business risks”
should be covered; but, in my view, economic
depression, hyperinflation, and financial implo-
sion are not included.
The stock market responds to changing expec-
tations concerning corporate profits, which
depend in part on the state of the real economy.
Slow economic growth or outright recession tends
to reduce profits and the level of stock prices. It
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reflect knowledge that the central bank will
respond constructively to new information about
the likely course of the real economy. And I use
the word “knowledge” deliberately and not just
the word “expectation” to emphasize the impor-
tance of a high degree of market confidence in the
central bank. When there is a high degree of con-
fidence in the central bank, everyone should
believe that the central bank will respond to
events that might otherwise drive the economy
into recession. In this sense, a “Fed put” should
exist. A central bank is supposed to do what it
can to maintain employment at a high level.
Of course, at the current state of knowledge,
the central bank cannot prevent all recessions.
A central bank may be unable to prevent some
recessions because it has incomplete knowledge
of how businesses, households, and markets
behave. In other cases, a central bank has no way
of forecasting certain events that may drive the
economy into recession.
A central bank can do its best to respond
appropriately to events like the stock market
crash of 1987 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
When such a shock occurs, market participants
may be unsure about the appropriate response,
and the central bank may also be unsure. Never-
theless, market participants have good reason to
believe that the central bank will respond as the
appropriate response becomes clear. Confidence
in the central bank in this sense helps to stabilize
markets.
I have emphasized the importance of Fed
stabilization policy for the financial markets. The
same arguments hold with equal force for markets
for goods and for productive inputs. Decisions
on the allocations of capital and labor are more
efficient in an environment of general economic
stability. Long-lived capital projects require con-
fidence in monetary stability. Of course, other
aspects of government policy are equally impor-
tant, such as the rule of law and the tax and reg-
ulatory environments.
DOES FED POLICY SUCCESS
BREED FINANCIAL MARKET
INSTABILITY?
Some have argued, Hyman Minsky most
prominently,8 that monetary policy success
breeds greater financial instability by encourag-
ing investors to assume more risk, especially
through greater leverage. Perhaps this contention
is at the heart of the argument that recent Fed
policy actions in response to the subprime mort-
gage mess will only increase financial risks in
the future.
It is hard to figure out how to test the Minsky
proposition, but my instinct is that it is not cor-
rect. As vexing as the current market situation is,
it is important to remember that in the early 1980s
the unwinding of the Great Inflation led to failure
of many industrial firms, farmers, banks, and
eventually a large part of the savings and loan
industry. The financial turmoil of 1998 seems
mild by comparison with the early 1980s; of
course, we do not yet know the full extent of the
current turmoil in housing and housing finance.
If an empirical test would be inconclusive,
which I think it probably would be, our only
recourse is to argue from a somewhat abstract
perspective. We do have good reason to believe,
both from theory and experience, that price level
instability increases financial instability. Large
changes in the inflation rate, up or down, are
always unanticipated. Thus, inflation creates
unanticipated changes in the real value of bonds
and other contracts stated in nominal terms. The
gains and losses tend to be capricious, and losses
can be large enough to bankrupt those on the
wrong side of the unanticipated change in infla-
tion. The same problem arises when economic
activity changes in an unanticipated fashion—
bankruptcies rise during recessions.
When the price level is reasonably stable
and economic activity is growing reasonably
smoothly, macroeconomic risks are reduced.
Market Bailouts and the “Fed Put”
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8 A convenient bibliography of Minsky’s work and of work about his ideas can be found at http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/minsky.htm.However, microeconomic risks do not disappear.
The hedge fund is a good example of a firm
designed to exploit microeconomic risks. The
basic idea of the hedge fund is to take positions
based on relative calculations of various sorts. In
a particular industry, a hedge fund might take a
long position in what it believes to be stronger
firms and a short position in weaker firms. Con-
centration on microeconomic issues is exactly
what is supposed to happen with reduction of
macroeconomic risks. High leverage does increase
risk, but does so in the context of both macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic uncertainty.
Since the end of the Great Inflation, most
bouts of financial instability have been associated
with innovation and not with excesses created
by economic stability. Innovations of all sorts
encourage experimentation; some of the experi-
ments turn out badly until engineering and man-
agement practices adapt to the innovations. As
the use of steam engines spread in many different
applications in the nineteenth century, boiler
explosions were common. Railroad bridges fell
down. The new technology of the Internet led
to the dot-com bubble. We have seen the same
process with financial innovation—portfolio
insurance failed in the stock market crash of
1987 and highly mathematical trading strategies
failed LTCM. Certain underwriting and securiti-
zation strategies for subprime mortgages are in
the process of failing today, at enormous cost not
only to investors but also to homeowners facing
foreclosure. I do not believe that the failure of
any of these financial innovations was related to
the more stable price level and more stable econ-
omy of the past quarter century compared with
the previous quarter century.
Some financial strategies will go the way of
the steam automobile; others will be refined and
become as common and routinely successful as
the personal computer. Who today does not
accept the basic idea of portfolio analysis, in
which individual securities are not studied in
isolation but in the context of their covariances
with other securities?
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In the Employment Act of 1946, Congress
charged the Fed with promoting “maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power.”
Not that long before the Employment Act a dif-
ferent view prevailed. David Cannadine, in his
Mellon: An American Life, wrote recently about
Andrew Mellon’s attitudes during the early part
of the Great Depression:
Mellon constantly lectured the president on
the importance of letting things be. The secre-
tary belonged (as Hoover would recall) to the
“leave it alone, liquidationist school,” and his
formula was “liquidate labor, liquidate stocks,
liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.”
(Cannadine, 2006, p. 445)
That view is long gone. Macroeconomists
today do not believe that policies to stabilize the
price level and aggregate economic activity create
a hazard. Federal Reserve policy that yields
greater stability has not and will not protect from
loss those who invest in failed strategies, finan-
cial or otherwise. Investors and entrepreneurs
have as much incentive as they ever had to man-
age risk appropriately. What they do not have to
deal with is macroeconomic risk of the magnitude
experienced all too often in the past.
In the present situation, many investors in
subprime paper will take heavy losses and there
is no monetary policy that could avoid those
losses. Clearly, recent Fed policy actions have
not protected investors in subprime paper. The
policy objective is not to prevent losses but to
restore normal market processes. The issue is not
whether subprime paper will trade at 70 cents
on the dollar, or 30 cents, but that the paper in
fact can trade at some market price determined
by usual market processes. Since August, such
paper has traded hardly at all. An active financial
market is central to the process of economic
growth, and it is that growth, not prices in finan-
cial markets per se, that the Fed cares about.
One of the most reliable and predictable fea-
tures of the Fed’s monetary policy is action to
prevent systemic financial collapse. If this regu-
larity of policy is what is meant by the “Fed put,”
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extremely misleading. The Fed does not have
the desire or tools to prevent widespread losses
in a particular sector but should not sit by while
a financial upset becomes a financial calamity
affecting the entire economy. Whether further cuts
in the federal funds rate target will alleviate
financial turmoil, or risk adding to it, is always
an appropriate topic for the FOMC to discuss.
But one thing should be clear: The Fed does not
have the power to keep the stock market at the
“proper” level, both because what is proper is
never clear and because the Fed does not have
policy instruments it can adjust to have predict-
able effects on stock prices.
From time to time, to be sure, Fed action to
stabilize the economy—to cushion recession or
deal with a systemic financial crisis—will have
the effect of pushing up stock prices. That effect
is part of the transmission mechanism through
which monetary policy affects the economy.
However, it is a fundamental misreading of mon-
etary policy to believe that the stock market per
se is an objective of policy. It is also a mistake to
believe that a policy action that is desirable to
help stabilize the economy should not be taken
because it will also tend to increase stock prices.
It makes no sense to let the economy suffer from
continuing declines in stock prices for the purpose
of “teaching stock market speculators a lesson.”
“Teaching a lesson” is eerily reminiscent of
Mellon’s liquidationist view. Nor should the cen-
tral bank attempt to protect investors from their
unwise decisions. Doing so would only divert
policy from its central responsibility to maintain
price stability and high employment.
The Fed would create moral hazard if it were
to attempt to pump up the stock market whenever
it fell, regardless of whether or not such policy
actions served the fundamental objectives of
monetary policy. I have observed no evidence to
suggest that the Fed has pursued such a course.
That financial markets are more stable because
market participants expect the Fed to be success-
ful in achieving its policy objectives is a desirable
and expected outcome of good monetary policy.
There is no moral hazard when largely predictable
policy responses to new information have effects
on financial markets.
That the monetary policy principles I have
discussed here are unclear to many in the finan-
cial markets is unfortunate. Macroeconomic sta-
bilization does not raise moral hazard issues
because a stable economy provides no guarantee
that individual firms and households will be
protected from failure. Improved public under-
standing of this point will not only help the Fed
to do its job more effectively but also will help
private sector firms to understand better how to
manage risk.
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